air force sf A US Air Force war game shows what the service needs to hold off — or win against — China in 2030附评价
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标题其实很明确，即使出现攻打台湾，也会是2030年的事情。目前中国的情况也恰恰如此，海空军都还在建设中，五代机的形态存在很大不粗，即使面对F35单机都难以取得优势，更何况还存在数量严重不足的问题，其他的类似于CEC协同作战系统的网络都还在搭建中。海军更少如此，航母目前主要执行的训练和磨练打法的问题，尚难说形成什么对美国航母编队的作战能力。
文章网址：
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force repelled a Chinese invasion of Taiwan during a massive war game last fall by relying on drones acting as a sensing grid, an advanced sixth-generation fighter jet able to penetrate the most contested environments, cargo planes dropping pallets of guided munitions and other novel technologies yet unseen on the modern battlefield.
NGAD这类六代机凭借宽频和全向隐身以及更加强大的独立作战能力（也是更强大的网络中心战和独立和联合电子战能力）是可以执行穿透制空的任务的。其他的，比如运输机投送的托盘式弹药，在金帐汗国项目下的弹药协同技术解决后，是可以起到武库机的作用的。
But the service’s success was ultimately pyrrhic. After much loss of life and equipment, the U.S. military was able to prevent a total takeover of Taiwan by confining Chinese forces to a single area.
料敌从宽吧，美国人承认面对实力相当的竞争对手，会是惨胜，这个惨胜可能导致结果就是类似于第一次和第二次世界大战期间英国都是战胜国，但国力被耗尽而导致自己被超越的问题。美国人面临的局面会是，和中国打一场惨胜的战争从而导致自己被其他国家超越，还是维持这种局面找到和中国共处的方式（和平就是扯淡了）
Furthermore, the air force that fought in the simulated conflict isn’t one that exists today, nor is it one the service is seemingly on a path to realize. While legacy planes like the B-52 bomber and newer ones like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter played a role, many key technologies featured during the exercise are not in production or even planned for development by the service.
这个推演具备现实基础，但依然强调前瞻性，所以所纳入的很多技术是目前处于研讨和开发阶段的，这个才是重点---以现有装备和现有作战模式、形态，美国打赢对中国的战争会损失更大。所以，新的作战理念和作战技术才是关键。
Still, the outcome was a marked improvement to similar war games held over the last two years, which ended in catastrophic losses. The Air Force’s performance this fall offers a clearer vision of what mix of aircraft, drones, networks and other weapons systems it will need in the next decade if it hopes to beat China in a potential war. Some of those items could influence fiscal 2023 budget deliberations.
美国空军的战略层面的认识是高度清晰和一致的，在面对国会老爷的时候，在有限的预算情况下，空军必须要阐明未来十年所需的飞机，无人机，网络和其他武器系统的前景和逻辑，而这类规划需要马上体现在2023财年的预算中。
China is “iterating so rapidly, and I think that forces us to change,” said Lt. Gen. Clint Hinote, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategy, integration and requirements, told Defense News in March. “If we can change, we can win.”
“如果我们能够改变，我们就能赢。”这个是布朗一直在说的，罗珀是坚定地推行变革的人，他走了之后，继任者仍然坚定地沿着这条路线走下去。
这个改变和文章结尾出关于改变价值的说的需要结合了看，改变是点睛之笔。
A ‘hard target’
Air Force officials talked about the classified war game’s results with Defense News in March, just months before the service is set to release its fiscal 2022 budget — its first spending request under the new Biden administration.
In similar war games held in 2018 and 2019, the Air Force failed disastrously.
The 2018 exercise involved an easier scenario in the South China Sea where the service fielded a force similar to the one it operates today; but it lost the game in record time. The following year, during a Taiwan invasion scenario, the Air Force experimented with two different teams of aircraft that either operated inside of a contested zone or stayed at standoff distances to attack a target. The service lost, but officials believed they were closer to finding an optimal mix of capabilities.
The findings helped determine what the Air Force fielded for its 2020 war game — played out by the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability team — over a two-week period.
One breakthrough moment, recounted Hinote, occurred at the start of the game. When the officer in charge of commanding the “red team,” which simulated China, looked out at the playing field, he initially declined to move forward with an invasion of Taiwan. China considers the self-governing province of Taiwan as its sovereign territory, and has vowed to unite it with the mainland.
“The red commander looked at the playing board and said: ‘This is not rational for China to initiate an invasion, given this posture that I’m facing,’” Hinote said.
上面这段话需要看另外一个报道，奥斯汀在出席美国印太司令部的司令交接典礼的发言，提醒美国需要重新回到珍珠港时刻，需要在更早之前将这种吓阻做的更扎实，Throughout American history, deterrence has meant fixing a basic truth within the minds of our potential foes: and that truth is, that the costs and risks of aggression are out of line with any conceivable benefit.................Now, the cornerstone of America’s defense is still deterrence, ensuring that our adversaries understand the folly of outright conflict.
演讲原文https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2592154/secretary-of-defense-remarks-for-the-us-indopacom-change-of-command/
报道的摘录：
美国国防部长奥斯汀（Lloyd Austin）4月30日在演说中表示，与美国先前进行的战争相比，下一场主要战争将「截然不同」；并称美军将结合所有军种、新科技，以及全球盟友的力量，让对手知道挑起冲突「是一件很愚蠢的事」。
奥斯汀在出席美国印太司令部的司令交接典礼时表示，虽然他目前已是文职身分，但在过去20年中，他几乎所有时间都花在「最后一场旧式战争」之中；并说尽管他永远不会忘记中东战事带给他的教训，但下一场主要战争的打法，将和美国曾参与的那些战争「截然不同」。
不过奥斯汀也强调，防止冲突发生远比参与重要，「跟熊熊大火相比，还是扑灭一小块余烬比较简单」；因此美国仍将以强化吓阻能力为主要目标，让对手知道挑起冲突能获得的利益远不如损失，「是一件很愚蠢的事」。而要达成此目标，美国将采取新的「整合性吓阻」（integrated deterrence），结合所有能力，发挥1加1大于2的效果。
他解释，整合性吓阻仍依循固有的吓阻逻辑，但包含最新的武器和技术，如人工智慧（AI）和量子电脑等；并将打造新的作战概念，消除各军种、政府机构、外国盟友和其他伙伴之间的隔阂，可靠且灵活地融合地面、空中、海上、太空和网路能力，让对手无法招架。
虽然奥斯汀在演说中并未提及中国大陆或俄罗斯等特定对手，不过先前JING告中国大陆可能在未来几年内犯台的戴维森（Phil Davidson）上将，当天在卸下印太司令的离任演说中再次强调，中国大陆正采取「有害行为」，挑战美国于印太区域的支配地位，并试图将国际秩序转为对自己有利；而走马上任的新印太司令阿奎利诺（John Aquilino）上将，更在致辞时，特别指名欢迎台湾海军司令刘志斌上将等盟邦海军高官，美国态度可见一斑。
But the Air Force wasn’t going to end the war game before it even started. The red commander pushed forward with an invasion anyway.
For the war game, the Air Force made several underlying assumptions that the U.S. military and its partners will be successful in overcoming certain fiscal and technological challenges.
For example, in the service’s version of the future, the U.S. military had implemented its Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept, which would allow the armed services to send data among their previously unconnected sensors and shooters. This meant the Air Force had fielded its Advanced Battle Management System, which could work with networks and communications technologies procured as part of the Navy’s Project Overmatch and the Army’s Project Convergence efforts.
In addition, Taiwan had successfully increased defense spending as outlined by President Tsai Ing-wen, who has called for buying drones and electronic warfare equipment along with M1A2 Abrams tanks and F-16V fighter jets, as well as upgrading to its Patriot missile defense system, according to Reuters.
The U.S. Air Force also fought with a notional force that allowed it to operate different technologies that are not currently in its budget plans.
In addition, before the conflict started, the Air Force took steps to disaggregate both its operational footprint and its command-and-control structure. It made investments to remote airfields across the Pacific region — fortifying and lengthening runways as well as pre-positioning repair equipment and fuel — so that forces could deploy to those locations during a war instead of main operational bases. This approach is something the service calls “agile combat employment.”
“We tried to design ourselves where we would be a hard target. As an example, we never filled up any airfield more than 50 percent, so even if you lost that entire airfield, you wouldn’t lose your entire fleet,” Hinote said.
美国需要推动的不仅是本身的JADC2，还要把盟友纳入进来。北约联合空中能力中心（JAPCC）近日发布《北约联合全域作战：在混合环境中联合全域作战的综合方法》报告，从北约联军视角对联合全域作战（JADO）概念与多域作战（MDO）概念进行了分析，并提出一个北约联合全域作战项目（NATO JADO），对其定义、目标、范围和当前研究主题进行了全面阐述，期望能够建立一支完全可操作的综合化作战部队。
https://ibook.antpedia.com/x/610611.html
美国试图建立亚洲的北约，也需要在盟友中推进JADO，这包括台湾。
Finally, instead of separate command organizations for the land, maritime and air domains, the Air Force created small command-and-control teams comprised of five to 30 individuals from all the services. The team members were able to oversee the battlespace and direct forces using portable technology, such as hand-held tablets.
“You would pass off the command of your forces, and in a way that meant that you were not ever knocked out of the fight,” Hinote said. “They could knock [Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii] out of the fight. In fact, they do almost every time we play this. But what they can’t do is they can’t knock out every command-and-control element that you have out there.”
分布式和敏捷作战的模式，上面已经说的很明白了，即使到了珍珠港时刻，珍珠港被摧毁，而美国的力量仍然在，这就是分布式作战的优势所在。当它将力量分布在太平洋的各个岛屿上，这种数量众多的分布式力量存在，导致对手没有打击的核心目标，即使打击了也无法实现战略和战役目的。
Now, what has emerged is a list of what the Air Force thinks it needs to win a war after 2030:
Tactical aircraft
The air power community has been divided in recent years over how to affordably replace the Air Force’s aging tactical aircraft fleet while ensuring there are enough advanced fighters to battle the likes of Russia or China.
Should the service move forward with its plan to eventually replace the A-10, F-16 and some F-15C/D aircraft with stealthy fifth-generation F-35s? Or could a mix of F-35s and new fourth-generation jets like the F-15EX give the service more flexibility?
This disagreement heightened in February, when Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown floated the idea of designing a less expensive, non-stealthy follow-on fighter to replace the service’s oldest F-16s, instead of replacing them with the F-35, as had been planned for decades.
The service is currently evaluating its options through a tactical aircraft study to inform the fiscal 2023 budget, which could result in cuts to the Air Force’s program of record for 1,763 F-35As.
“We don’t have to make that decision this year,” Hinote said. However, he added, the roles each aircraft played during the war game could influence the outcome of the study “to a great degree.”
In the war game, four types of aircraft made up the Air Force’s future fighter inventory. Three of those are ongoing programs of record for the service:
- The highly advanced Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft, or NGAD, and its associated systems, which were capable of penetrating highly contested airspace.
- The Lockheed Martin-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which operated as a “workhorse” aircraft attacking targets at short ranges.
- Boeing F-15EX aircraft, which mainly conducted defensive missions but were also loaded with long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons to strike targets farther downrange.
Finally, the service operated a non-stealthy, light, tactical fighter for homeland and base defense, which could also be flown in support of counterterrorism missions. That aircraft, which aligns with Brown’s idea for a “fourth-generation plus” replacement for the F-16, doesn’t currently exist in the service’s budget plans.
For years, Air Force officials have portrayed the F-35 as the aircraft that it would use to infiltrate into enemy airspace to knock out surface-to-air missiles and other threats without being seen. However, in the war game, that role was played by the more survivable NGAD, in part due to the F-35′s inability to traverse the long ranges of the Pacific without a tanker nearby, Hinote said.
F35的作战半径是要命的缺陷，但F35已经到了工程的极限了，没办法再增加更多的燃油了，这又是回到以色列的诉求，增加可抛弃式隐身外挂油箱。事实上，原本洛克希德马丁（Lockheed Martin）探索过在F-35的内置机翼站轴（Wing Station）装设可抛式油箱的可能性，甚至绘制了蓝图，要专门打造460加仑的油箱。
不过，据说可抛式油箱会妨碍到机翼挂载的武器（影响隐身的问题，反而是次要的，通过可关闭式舱盖是可以解决油箱抛弃后机翼下裸露的触点部分的隐身问题，这个是可以通过增加可闭合式盖板类实现隐身），以致美国空军很矛盾，于是洛马就暂时放弃了这构想。https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/04/27/for-war-with-iran-and-china-the-f-35-stealth-fighter-needs-more-gas/?ss=aerospace-defense&sh=4e65c819c86d
所以，还是尽快推动GE的六代变循环发动机装机吧，别再叽叽歪歪了，这个才是解决问题的根本办法。
Instead, the F-35 attacked Chinese surface ships and ground targets, protected American and Taiwanese assets from Chinese aircraft, and provided cruise missile defense during the exercise. But “it’s not the one that’s pushing all the way in [Chinese airspace], or even over China’s territory,” Hinote said.
Notably, the F-35s used during the war game were the more advanced F-35 Block 4 aircraft under development, which will feature a suite of new computing equipment known as “Tech Refresh 3,” enhancements to its radar and electronic warfare systems, and new weapons.
“We wouldn’t even play the current version of the F-35,” Hinote said. “It wouldn’t be worth it. … Every fighter that rolls off the line today is a fighter that we wouldn’t even bother putting into these scenarios.”
洛马应该会是高度郁闷的，除了F35 BLOCK4是空军想要的机之外。耗费如此庞大的项目下的机型，甚至都不是the one that’s pushing all the way in [Chinese airspace], or even over China’s territory。当然，后面这句话We wouldn’t even play the current version of the F-35，说明了目前F35状态的垃圾性质。For years, Air Force officials have portrayed the F-35 as the aircraft that it would use to infiltrate into enemy airspace to knock out surface-to-air missiles and other threats without being seen.F35从来也不可能是穿透的机型，即使是F22当年也只是作为踹门者，而不是穿透打击（这个是B21的定位和职责）。只能这么说吧，空军配合洛马忽悠国会这么多年，空军玩不下去了，当空军看的是十年后的目标时，F35A的目前状态是不能满足要求的。所以洛马需要加快了，并且空军可能没有额外的预算给它。目前国会已经将之前惯例的额外采购都砍掉了。The service is currently evaluating its options through a tactical aircraft study to inform the fiscal 2023 budget, which could result in cuts to the Air Force’s program of record for 1,763 F-35As.这个是更要命的事情，洛马命悬一线啊。
F15EX是肯定要作为战斗卡车的，最近开发的功能是直接让F15E挂载大量炸弹作为运输机运至目的地，这个效率甚至比运输机效率还要高的多了去。F15EX未来搭载高超声速武器和作为炸弹卡车的作用可见一斑。https://www.afcent.af.mil/Units/332nd-Air-Expeditionary-Wing/News/Article/2590760/first-time-deployed-fighters-employ-new-munitions-ferry-tactic/
至于CQ Brown floated the idea of designing a less expensive, non-stealthy follow-on fighter to replace the service’s oldest F-16s, instead of replacing them with the F-35, as had been planned for decades.这个说法，仅限于布朗自己的提法，F36作为非隐身的定位太操蛋了，但强调走单发和轻型化路线倒是可能的，只是这个定位和F35目前出现的航程不足的逻辑是矛盾的。你一方面吵着说F35不能满足作战要求，其中的一个大问题是作战半径不够，另外一方面又要研制一款作战半径甚至更小的情形战机，这个是蛋疼吗？目前能满足要求，也就是无人僚机的几种，比如ATS LOYAL WINGMAN，这个是波音和纸猫联合的东西，然后就是美国空军自己的XQ58A。这个机，可能会代表一种巨大的转变，那就是JADC2到底能都强大到超越传统模式，甚至超越隐身的需求。大家静观其变吧。
Drones and more drones
Much of the Air Force’s legacy drone inventory — such as the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper and Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk — operated in combat during the 2000s and 2010s across the uncontested battlespaces of the Middle East, where U.S. adversaries could not present significant electronic warfare or counter-air capabilities. But a war with a competitor like China some 30 years later requires more advanced and survivable drones.
MQ9这种无人机已经是不适合中美在台湾海峡的对抗了，只有下一代无人机才能满足要求。目前的XQ58A和波音的ATS LOYAL WINGMAN都是不错的机型。
For the war game, the Air Force relied on a mix of systems that are either under development or not currently sought by the service’s acquisition arm.
Autonomous “Loyal Wingman” drones flew alongside penetrating fighters in contested zones, providing additional firepower and sensor data to human pilots. Hinote pointed to Australia’s Loyal Wingman aircraft, which is produced by Boeing and flew for the first time in February, as an “impressive” capability that the U.S. sought to mirror in its war game.
Across the Taiwan Strait, the service operated a mass of small, inexpensive drones that formed a mesh network. Although they were mostly used as a sensing grid, some were outfitted with weapons capable of — for instance — hitting small ships moving from the Chinese mainland across the strait.
“An unmanned vehicle that is taking off from Taiwan and doesn’t need to fly that far can actually be pretty small. And because it’s pretty small, and you’ve got one or two sensors on it, plus a communications node, then those are not expensive. You could buy hundreds of them,” he said.
In the second island chain, the Air Force operated low-cost attritable drones out of installations such as Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. These aircraft, like the Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie currently undergoing tests by the service, delivered ordnance against ships, aircraft and ground-based targets. Attritable drones are cheap enough that combat losses can be endured by commanders.
这一处讨论到台湾问题，这需要台湾甚至放弃自己的独立地位独立国防，甘愿将自己置于JADC2中作为美国这个系统的一部分，甚至要承受损失遭受攻击。And because it's pretty small, and you've got one or two sensors on it, plus a communications node, then those are not expensive.这类无人机，从单机性能来说甚至是垃圾级别的，这也是成本可控的诀窍，防止出现单机过高的性能过多的功能（过多的传感器）导致单机成本过高。这也是我和辰兆之间的不同理解，XQ58A这种无人机，单机价格目前也就是500万美金，未来甚至还要明显降低。
Even farther out, the service flew a notional successor to the RQ-4 Global Hawk, which Hinote said would not survive a conflict with China in the mid-2030s.
Instead of concentrating on ISR, the Air Force primarily used the RQ-4 replacement as a long-range communications node, sometimes outfitting it with more exquisite radar that can track moving, airborne targets. Hinote likened the platform to an unmanned version of Australia’s E-7A Wedgetail aircraft.
“You’re using the huge aperture in there and all the power that’s there, but it’s crewed by people on the ground somewhere else,” he said. “It’s kind of a transition from where we are today to the future. You can’t do that with the E-3 [airborne early warning and control plane]; it’s just too old of an aircraft.”
这一处涉及RQ4和下一代预JING机的问题，但RQ4是一码事，这个更应该是诺格那个神秘的RQ180要承担的责任，而预JING机是预JING机。E3肯定是过于老旧了，E7A也许复合要求，但此类过于中心化的大型预JING机还是多少不符合分布式吧。这也看美国是否有能力通过分布式网络来解决预JING的问题，F35 BLOCK4是可以通过四机联网从而实现小型预JING网络的问题。但空军在协同作战方面，对比海军是差距太大了，目前海军是完全具备通过分布式传感器来实现同一张图的问题，CEC和NIFI-CA是好东西，空军目前还没这个东西，只能在去中心化这种分布式作战中还要保留这个不得不忍受的大中心。
Bombers, tankers and airlift
Neither China nor the United States resorted to using nuclear weapons during the war game — a consequence, Hinote said, of being able to present a credible threat to China that the U.S. has the arsenal necessary to retaliate to a Chinese strike. However, the B-21 and B-52 bombers played active roles, providing conventional firepower during the scenario, with the B-21 penetrating into contested zones and the B-52 remaining at standoff distances.
Once the war game started and the fight began, it became difficult for the Chinese and U.S. militaries to conduct airlift missions within range of each other’s missile threats. That made it critical for the U.S. Air Force to be able to pre-position food, water, medical supplies and the equipment needed run an airfield — including aircraft parts, fuel and weapons — at the locations from which it plans to operate, Hinote said.
Even though airlift assets like the C-17 and C-130 couldn’t transport cargo or people to the fight in the early days of the conflict, the aircraft still played an offensive role by launching palletized munitions that are bundled together with a guidance package and airdropped from a plane.
“One interesting thing about possible war with a peer competitor is you’re pretty agnostic as to where the fires come from; you just need the fires,” Hinote said. “I don’t want to give the impression that we’re going to create bombers out of every C-17 out there. But in certain phases of a campaign like this, you really need the extra missiles.”
五角大楼杰奎琳·范·奥沃斯特将军曾经发文设想，该司令部最近在一架C-17 Glodemaster III（C-17环球霸王3）运输机上空投了装有托盘的模拟联合直接攻击弹药炸弹，以测试能够将空中运输机变成“炸弹卡车”的能力。当然，更进一步是把此类运输机也要作为空军网络的数据中继设备或通信节点，就可以为作战指挥官提供战术数据链，不管是接近敌方飞机还是超出视线范围，美国飞机都在那里，那么为什么不增加联合部队，为海陆空军提供必要的通信，并保持领先地位？而且这个想法可以追溯到将近20年前的阿富汗和伊拉克战争。值得注意的是，如果部队需要超出可传输范围的图像、视频、信号或者是通信，即使这种传输被敌人切断或阻塞，AMC飞机可以充当空中助推器，就例如KC-46加油机，此款加油机已经安装了通信系统。
海军的武库舰确实是深入人心吧，目前华盛顿级弹道导弹核潜艇改成巡航导弹潜艇，搭载上百枚战斧满世界晃悠，对空军的刺激还是蛮深刻的。当然，运输机投送炸弹/弹道弹药托盘进行发射的模式，还需要金帐汗国项目下的弹药协同机制。这个也是海军领先的领域。
A full complement of KC-46 tankers fulfilled the aerial refueling mission during the scenario, but were kept out of high-threat environments.
The Air Force also experimented with several notional next-generation tanker designs to understand the trade-offs between fielding many small tankers capable of refueling many aircraft at a time versus operating large tankers that can carry a massive amount of fuel.
“We’re hoping that that’s going to help us as we think about what is the next step in air refueling. Do we just go buy more KC-46s? Do we look at some other type of tanking concepts and try to create a capability around that?” Hinote wondered. “I don’t have an answer for that yet because the excursions were somewhat inclusive, and they depend on a lot of things that you’re making decisions on now,” such as the mix of fighters and bombers.
这一段几乎都是打脸空军而跪舔海军的。空军走的是中心化的大型加油机，而海军走的是去中心化的小型加油机MQ25。而目前KC46A问题一堆，即使未来成熟了，也仍然未必比海军的分布式加油好用。当然，KC46A还是有用的啊，比如给B21加油。
空军和陆军在下一代作战理念和先进技术的推进方面，确实落后海军太多了。好吧，知耻后勇。
What happens now?
The outcome of the war game was a United States victory, where the U.S. Air Force helped rebuff the Chinese military from taking over Taiwan. But any U.S. fight with a nation-state like China has the potential to be catastrophic for both countries.
Both the United States and Taiwan suffered high levels of attrition during the exercise, with an even higher rate of casualties among Chinese forces. Hinote declined to share exact figures due to the classification of the exercise, but said the Air Force incurred losses an “order of magnitude” lower than those projected by the service in its 2018 war game.
“The force that we had programmed, say, in 2018 took devastating losses. This force doesn’t take those devastating losses,” Hinote said. “They do take losses. We do lose a lot of airmen. It is a difficult fight.
台湾问题的解决从来就是中美之间的问题，美国损失多大这个是影响天平平衡的因素。目前来看，如果美国空军改变，包括推进JADC2项目下的各项规划，是可能将天平推向有利于减少美国损失的方向发展，这也是为什么要严重关注JADC2的原因。
“And that kind of gets to the point of what does it take to stand up to China in the Indo-Pacific, literally on their front doorstep. And the answer is: It takes a willingness to be able to suffer those losses. It’s just a difficult, very sobering reality that we have.”
The service plans to take its findings to Capitol Hill in the hopes of gaining the support of lawmakers for the difficult force posture decisions coming down the line in upcoming budget discussions. Brown, the Air Force’s top general, has indicated that programs could be canceled and legacy aircraft retired as the service seeks to revolutionize its technology.
But as Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense budget expert with the American Enterprise Institute, wrote in a March report, Congress has repeatedly rolled back the service’s plans to cut its existing force structure.
“This leaves the Air Force trapped in a near-term Catch-22,” she stated. “On one hand, it is trying to divest itself of decades-old legacy airframes, which drive up [operations and maintenance] costs every year, so that it can reinvest in next-generation platforms. On the other hand, its replacement aircraft programs will not be operational fast enough to meet the ongoing demands of global operations, even if the net savings from legacy divestments are sufficient to fund new platforms.”
During the war game last fall, the Air Force invited staff members from the congressional defense committees to help shape the exercise and interpret the results, hoping to pave the way for its narrative to gain traction among lawmakers.
在去年秋天的战争游戏中，空军邀请了国会国防委员会的工作人员帮助制定演习并解释演习结果，希望为其演说铺平道路，以赢得议员们的关注。
“We’re trying to help people see the future, what it might look like, the types of choices it would take” to win a war, all keeping in mind “the evidence-based possibility that if we were able to change, we probably wouldn’t have to fight,” Hinote said. “And that’s a reason to change.”
我们正在努力帮助国会老爷们看到未来，如果我们采取那些去赢得战争的改变的选择，并且牢记存在有证可循的可能，如果我们改变了，那么可能不用去打一场战争。
文章结尾重回拍了奥斯汀的马屁。奥斯丁在出席美国印太司令部的司令交接典礼的发言，提醒美国需要重新回到珍珠港时刻，需要在更早之前将这种吓阻做的更扎实，要让对手知道挑起冲突「很愚蠢」。Throughout American history, deterrence has meant fixing a basic truth within the minds of our potential foes: and that truth is, that the costs and risks of aggression are out of line with any conceivable benefit.................Now, the cornerstone of America’s defense is still deterrence, ensuring that our adversaries understand the folly of outright conflict.
演讲原文https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2592154/secretary-of-defense-remarks-for-the-us-indopacom-change-of-command/